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RACIAL BIAS AND THE LSAT: A NEW APPROACH
TO THE DEFENSE OF PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS
INTRODUCTION

In, 1972 over 80,000 people completed applications for about
37,000 available places in the 152 law schools in our country accredited by the American Bar Association.' Last year even a greater
number of applicants competed for about the same number of avail-

able spaces. 2 Since the majority of these applicants were considered

to be at least minimally qualified to be admitted to law school in
terms of quantitative predictors of academic success, a large number
of qualified applicants were denied the opportunity to pursue a legal

career. 8 The preferential admission 4 of large numbers of minority
students who would not be qualified under standards used for the
majority of the applicants has added even greater controversy to the

already sensitive subject of admission to law school. Robert M.
O'Neil, Professor of Law at the University of California (Berkeley),
has called the question of the preferential admission of minority students to schools of higher education "one of the most divisive issues
in American higher education." 5 Although the numerous legal, moral,
and educational issues surrounding this question have been vigorously
and extensively debated, the United States Supreme Court, although
presented with the question, has not yet decisively ruled upon the constitutionality of a preferential admissions policy.
The case which presented this question to the Court was DeFunis
1. Brief for the Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 3,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974)

[hereinafter cited as Brief for AALS].

2. See Brill, The Secrecy Behind the College Boards, NEw YORK MAGAZINE,
Oct. 7, 1974, at 74.
3. The demand for legal education so exceeded the supply in 1972 that
there were nearly two qualified applicants for each available seat in law
school in the fall, 1973 entering class. As a result, for the first time in the
history of United States legal education every accredited law school denied
admission to applicants whom it considered qualified for the study of law.
Brief for AALS, supra note 1, at 3.
4. As noted by Professor O'Neil, the term "preferential admission policy" connotes a wide range of possible alternatives. The meaning of this term throughout this
Comment will be restricted to a policy of differential evaluation of the standardized
objective criteria, such as LSAT scores, which are used to appraise the future performance of an applicant when the raw score may unfairly reflect true potential. See O'Neil,
PreferentialAdmissions, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 700 n.3 (1971).
5. Id. at 699.
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v. Odegaard.6 In 1971, Marco DeFunis applied for admission as a
student at the University of Washington Law School, a state operated
institution. DeFunis, who was one of about 1,600 applicants competing for 150 available openings, was eventually notified that he had
been denied admission. Subsequently, he brought suit against various
representatives of the University of Washington in a Washington
trial court seeking a mandatory injunction commanding the defendants to admit him as a member of the first-year class. The basic
grounds for his complaint were that "the procedure and criteria employed by the Law School Admissions Committee invidiously discriminated against him on account of his race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution." The trial court granted the requested relief and
DeFunis began his legal studies at the University of Washington in
the fall of 1971. On appeal, in reversing the judgment of the trial
court, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Law School's
preferential admissions policy did not violate the Constitution. Upon
petition to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari,
Justice Douglas "stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme
Court pending the 'final disposition of the case .. . .' " Due to this
stay, DeFunis remained in law school and was in his third and final
year at the time the certiorari petition was considered.
The basic issue presented in the case as characterized by Arval
A. Morris, Professor of Law at the University of Washington, was
[w]hether race can be a constitutionally valid criterion for admission
to a state law school if the law school's purpose and the effect of its
policy is not to stigmatize or segregate but partially to rectify and
ameliorate the consequences of racial segregation by effectively affording equal educational opportunity to certain minority group
members where previously it did not exist, notwithstanding the admitted detriment imposed on certain displaced non-minority group
applicants. 9
6. 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974), vacating as moot 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169
(1973).
7. 94 S. Ct. at 1704-05.
8. Id. at 1705.
9. Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law
Admissions, 49 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1973); cf. Brief for the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae at 2, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for ADL]; Brief for AALS at 2.
4
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This issue poses a difficult dilemma for law schools that seemingly
must choose between two potentially unconstitutional alternatives.
On the one hand, law schools may have a constitutional duty to make
legal educational opportunity equally available to qualified members
of all racial groups. However, the means used to achieve this goal
such as a preferential admissions program may unconstitutionally discriminate against innocent parties on racial grounds. 10
This issue was not considered by the majority of the Supreme
Court since the case was dismissed on grounds of mootness."1 In a
dissenting opinion, however, Justice Douglas attempted to resolve the
difficult constitutional question which would have been before the
Court had it found a justiciable "case or controversy." According to
Douglas, the key to this resolution lies in a preferential admissions
policy which is based not solely on race but on individual attributes.
He asserted that "[t]he key to the problem is the consideration of
each application in a racially neutral way."'1 2 However, Justice Douglas stated that the issue could not be resolved on the record presented
in DeFunis. He recommended that the case be remanded to consider
inter alia, if the objective criteria used by law schools admissions
committees, such as Law School Admission Test scores (hereinafter
referred to as LSAT), are racially biased. 13 Thus, Douglas implied that
the issue upon which the constitutionality of preferential admissions
may turn, that is the racial bias of the LSAT, was not properly presented by the parties. The next time the issue of the constitutionality
of preferential admissions is presented to the Court, the parties will
have to face the question raised by Douglas of whether the criteria
used for the allocation of the scarce benefit of legal education is
racially biased. This Comment will explore this issue and its implications.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK FOR PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS

A. Equal Protection
While preferential admissions policies have been challenged on
numerous extra legal grounds,' 4 the attack in DeFuniswas an alleged
10. Morris, supra note 9, at 45-46.
11. See 94 S. Ct. at 1704.
12. Id. at 1714 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1715.
14. See, e.g., Graglia, Special Admissions of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law
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denial of rights protected by the equal protection clause.15 This raised
the question of the nature of the concept of equality guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps an answer to this question can be
best approached by explaining what the equal protection clause does
not protect. The equal protection clause does not require state imposition of general equality in all phases of life but speaks in terms of
a concept of "equality of protection under the law."'16 Even this somewhat limited view of equality is not ensured until a course of conduct has been initiated by a state authority. Only after state action
is commenced can the equal protection clause be invoked to ensure
such action does not violate the notion of "equality of protection
under the law."' 7 Thus, the clause acts to limit state action and not
to initiate it. For these reasons, social, political, and philosophical
questions concerning the proper relationships between state and
citizen-questions relating to the proper limits on state actions - are
crucial to a discussion of the equal protection clause.
Theoretically, the United States has a free competitive economy
where goods are distributed primarily in the private rather than
public sector. Since the distribution of benefits and burdens in the
private sector allows those best equipped with society's desired characteristics to best succeed, a resulting inequality in possession of goods
reflects a "natural" sorting process with those endowed with the characteristics most prized by a particular society fulfilling their own
needs while also filling the needs of the greater society. Each society
which is ordered upon these principles "chooses which kinds of contributions it wishes to recognize as beneficial and then rewards [them]
accordingly in order to encourage them."' 8 In such a society, the
proper role of government is theoretically limited to curbing the
School, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 351 (1970) (asserting that preferential admissions will
not really benefit minority students and will in the long run harm many innocent

people); Jensen, Selection of Minority Students in Higher Education, 1970 U. ToL. L.

REv. 403 (compensatory programs alone not sufficient to overcome inherent learning

disabilities in minorities); Summers, Preferential Admissions, 1970 U. TOL. L. Rnv.
377 (asserting preferential admissions does not really increase opportunities for minority

students but merely creates handicap to professional training and wastes funds which
could be more profitably used for financial aid); O'Neil supra note 4, at 754-66

(summarizing many of these arguments).
15.
16.
(1969)
17.
18.

94 S. Ct. at 1704-05; see Brief for ADL. But see Brief for AALS.
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1065, 1161
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Id.
Id. at 1162.
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"excesses of liberty which threaten to infringe on the liberty of
others."'19
Focusing on the state's role as distributor of benefits and burdens,
the equal protection clause would be invoked most often to test the
propriety of this distribution in relation to the "naturally" resulting
inequalities produced in the private sector. While the equality of this
state intervention into the private sector can be viewed from several
vantage points, the concept of proportionate equality seems most applicable to the issue of preferential admissions. 20 Under this concept,
state governments are allowed to consider naturally existing differences
in humans and are then required to distribute the collective burdens
and benefits in a way which takes into consideration these individual
differences of need and merit. Thus, once a state has initiated the
distribution of a particular benefit, such as the opportunity to receive
a legal education at a state law school, the equal protection clause
would require that "all naturally equal persons must be afforded
'
equal access to this benefit.

21

B. Standard of Proof
Usually, a defendant who has been charged with an equal protection violation must sustain either one of two burdens of proof in
order to overcome the challenge. 22 Under a "minimal rationality"
standard of proof "a classification will not be invalidated if any
reasonable state of facts may be conceived to justify it."23 This standard
is often applied in instances of legislative classification affecting business or other economic interests. However, where a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental interest" is involved, a "strict scrutiny"
standard is applied. Under this standard the classification being chal19. Id., siting J. MILL,

ON LIBERTY

(1947).

20. See Morris, supra note 9, at 25. See generally Developments.

21. Morris, supra note 9, at 25. Since the fourteenth amendment applies to state
action, there is no problem with invoking its protection from actions initiated by a state
operated school as in DeFunis. However, "[p]rivate universities may also be bound by
the same restrictions applicable to state universities." Comment, Increasing Minority
Admissions in Law Schools, 20 BUFFALO L. Rav. 473, 478 n.29 (1971). See generally
O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. Rlv. 155 (1969).
22. Professor Gerald Gunther has described the emergence of a third standard
which he calls the "means-focused" model. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). See generally Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection, 23
BUFFALO L. REV. 665 (1974).
23. See Comment, supra note 22, at 665 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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lenged is presumed to be constitutionally invidious. This presumption
can be rebutted only by persuasive proof that a compelling govern24
mental objective is being furthered by the use of the classification.
There seems to be a general consensus that a preferential admissions policy which involves a racial classification is not per se unconstitutional but will receive a "strict scrutiny."25 The invocation of
this standard creates a presumption of unconstitutionality which can
be rebutted only by persuasive proof
(1) that the classification is not "invidious;" (2) that the classification is related to an "overriding" or "compelling" state interest; and
(3) that the use of race is a rational means of implementing that interest.2 6
The following arguments illustrate a possible approach to rebutting the presumption of unconstitutionality resulting under a strict
scrutiny test.
1. Invidious Discrimination.Under a strict scrutiny test, the first
issue which must be addressed is whether the racial classifications created under a preferential admissions program are invidiously discriminatory. The stigmatizing effect of state action "whose goal has been
either (a) to segregate the races or (b) to ban certain activity on the
basis of the race of the participants" ' 27 is usually sufficient to invalidate
such action on grounds of invidious discrimination. It could be
argued that a preferential admissions policy stigmatizes both minority
applicants who are singled out for preference and the majority applicants who are displaced by such a policy. Professor Robert M.
O'Neil argues, however, that a preferential admissions system for
minority students is clearly not invidiously discriminatory as the
courts have interpreted this concept. In support of this argument he
notes that "[t]he goal of preferential admissions is not to separate the
races, but to bring them together ....,,28 O'Neil's contention is supported by Morris who states that the racial classification created under
24. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); O'Neil, supra note 4, at 711.
25. See O'Neil, supra note 4, at 711, citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
26. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 711.

27. Id. at 712, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) and

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
unconstitutional).

(Virginia's antimiscegenation statute declared

28. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 713 (footnote omitted).
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a preferential admissions policy is necessary, and hence not invidious,
for achieving the legitimate state purpose of making the "opportunity
for a legal education equally available to persons of all racial
groups ....
"29
2. Compelling State Interest. If the threshold issue of invidiousness is overcome, one must still show further that the racial (lassification is "part of a program which furthers an 'overriding' or 'compelling' state interest," 0 in order to pass the test of "strict scrutiny."
O'Neil asserts that the de facto school segregation and analogous cases
strongly support the proposition that, by attempting- to create equalized access to schools of higher education for disadvantaged minority
groups, a compelling state interest is served by preferential admissions programs.31 Morris contends that the "gross statistical disparity
of access to legal education" 3 2 between minority and majority students
creates a prima facie case for invidious discrimination against minority students which a state would have a "compelling interest" in remedying. He goes further to assert that this remedial action may not
only be permissible but obligatory.38
3. Reasonable Means of Implementation. After it is proven that
preferential admissions programs are not invidiously discriminatory
and that a compelling state interest is furthered by them, additional
proof must be offered that a racial classification is a reasonable means
of implementing this compelling interest. O'Neil seems to dismiss
this issue by asserting that
[t]he preferential admission of members of certain racial minorities to
college should be able to meet a "reasonable means" test or even a
more stringent standard since racially-related educational deprivation
is the evil at which preferential admissions programs are principally
himed.34
29. Morris, supra note 9, at 35.
30. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 713, citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964).
31. See O'Neil, supra note 4, at 717. Professor O'Neil notes that "[w]hile most
courts have held that a state need not act affirmatively to end de facto segregation for
which it has not been directly responsible, courts have generally allowed local school
boards almost total discretion in selecting and implementing policies to overcome it."
Id. at 714-15 (footnotes omitted). See generally Askin, The Case for Compensatory
Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 65 (1969); Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the
1970's, 1970 Wis. L. R!v. 257.
32. Morris, supra note 9, at 39 n.138.

33. Id.

34. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 717.
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It is possible however that a court may impose an additional
burden under its strict scrutiny review. Proponents of a racially classificatory preferential admissions policy may be faced with the additional task of negating all possible nonracial alternatives .3 Morris
attempts to get past this problem by arguing that the evil of racial
deprivation can only be remedied by a corrective program such as
preferential admissions which must necessarily identify, and thus
racially classify, those requiring its benefits. He goes on to assert that
there is no reasonable alternative to preferential admissions and its
requisite racial classification. He feels that such racial classification
is as much a necessity in preferential admissions programs "as it was
in the remedial and corrective decrees fashioned by courts under the
authority of Brown I and Brown II." 36
One further issue may complicate the "reasonable implementation" requirement. As racial classifications will not be upheld if there
are reasonable alternatives available, so too will such classifications be
invalidated if they do not accurately define the class of persons who
qualify for preferential admissions. 37 This problem of "under- or overinclusiveness" has been described as the "Achilles heel" of the specific
preferential program utilized by the University of Washington Law
38 Since
School in DeFunis.
the definition of the class of persons to be
preferentially admitted is additionally subject to strict scrutiny, a law
school which fails to "provide any definition whatsoever of the 'minority group members' who qualified for its admissions preferences,"30 1
as was the case in DeFunis, would likely fail in its claim of constitutional validity for its preferential program.
The problems of formulating an accurate definition of those individuals to be preferentially admitted are compounded by the fact
that the class of "disadvantaged" persons requiring such benefits can
not be identified in racial terms alone. Obviously, the cultural and
educational conditions leading to inferior performance with regard
to the objective criteria used for admissions decisions are not confined
35. See id. at 717-18.

36. Morris, supra note 9, at 35. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
("Brown I"), relief granted, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II').
37. See Morris, supra note 9, at 47-48, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) and Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 733, 242 P.2d 617,
627 (1952).
38. See Morris, supra note 9, at 48.
(1954)

39. Id.

PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS

to the members of so-called minority groups. A "culturally deprived"
white will score just as poorly on a standardized test which has been
validated against traditional middle-class culture as will a black,
chicano, or American Indian who has not been brought up with
"mainstream" language and experience. 40 However, the fact that some
majority as well as minority students might be unfairly penalized by
the use of standardized indices for admissions decisions does not dilute
the central problem-that a "grossly disproportionate" number of
41
minority students never reach schools of higher education.
Moreover, even if this problem could be accurately viewed in
strictly racial terms, there are significant problems with the very words
used to describe the concept of "race." One problem in attempting to
identify who is a bona fide member of a racial minority group is that
"the concept of 'race' has no independent or scientific validity. ' 42 Contrary to the common usage of the term, "race" is a fairly imprecise
word used merely to describe the "classification of a population group
that exists within a species 43 and which, historically, has tended to
inbreed among itself for long periods of time" 44 resulting in certain
similar physical characteristics. However, the problem of the ambiguity
in racial classifications has been overcome in such notable cases as
Plessy v. Ferguson4 5 by alleging certain "racial" blood lines.
Whatever specific approach is ultimately used by proponents of
preferential admissions to overcome the third component of the strict
scrutiny test, it is clear that the problem of accurate classification
must be solved if the presumption of unconstitutionality is to be overcome under this test. Morris concludes that the specific preferential
admissions program used by the University of Washington Law School
in the DeFunis case was constitutionally defective principally because
of its failure to adequately deal with the "Achilles heel" of under40. See Comment, supra note 21, at 477-78; 68 COLUm. L. REV. 691, 692 (1968).

41. See O'Neil, supra note 4, at 733.
42. Morris, supra note 9, at 49. See also 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 692 (1968).
43. As described by Morris, "[a] species is a natural inbreeding population that is
reproductively isolated from all other populations in the sense that its members are not
capable of mating with members of other species and producing fertile offspring."
Morris, supra note 9, at 49.
44. Id., citing J. BARZUM, RACE (1965); S. GARN, HUMAN RACES (3d ed. 1971);

R.

GOLDSBY, RACE AND RACES

(1971); A.

MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH

(1964); L. MORRIS, HUMAN POPULATIONS, GENETIC VARIATION AND EVOLUTION
(1971); and Gain & Coon, On the Number of Races of Mankind, 57 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 996 (1955).
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Morris, supra note 9, at 50.
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or over-inclusiveness. 46 However, he suggests that a "carefully constructed and administered affirmative action program which properly
defined the racially preferred group could validly pass the test of
47
constitutionality."
While it is possible to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality created when a court invokes the test of strict scrutiny, the task
is herculean. Consequently, an alternative approach to the defense of
the classifications necessitated by preferential admissions would be
useful. One such alternative approach was implied by Douglas' dissent in DeFunis. If it can be shown that the objective criteria traditionally used for admissions decisions are invidiously discriminatory against minority students, it may be easier to justify the use of
a preferental admissions policy for potentially qualified applicants
who are penalized by the use of the standardized indices. Indeed, such
a finding could lead to the further determination that state law schools
have a constitutional duty to utilize a preferential policy which compensates for the racial bias inherent in the standardized indices. 48
A policy affording admissions preferences solely on the basis of
race would still have to pass the rigorous test of strict scrutiny and
overcome all of the problems associated with this standard. However,
proof that the objective criteria used for admissions decisions discriminates against members of certain racial groups would severely weaken
the claim that a procedure which takes into consideration such bias is
invidiously discriminatory against a member of a majority racial group
against which no comparable bias has been shown. It was recognized
in the amicus brief of the Anti-Defamation League, arguing on behalf
46. The law school relied upon self-characterization made by applicants, but
there is a fatal lack of identity or congruity in the racial categories. The law

school allowed an applicant to circle one of the following on his application:
"Afro-American, American Indian, Caucasian, Mexican American, Oriental,
Other (specify) . . . ." But it awarded its law admission preferences to "Black
Americans, Chicano Americans, American Indians, and Philippine Americans."
With the exception of "American Indian," the categories for self-characterization provided in the law school application form are not identical with the
categories of persons qualifying for an admissions preference.
Morris, supra note 9, at 50.
47. Id. at 51.

48. See generally DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. at 1708 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.

1970); Brief for ADL at 21; Askin, supra note 31; Bell, supra note 31; Morris, supra
note 9; Comment, supra note 21.
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of DeFunis, that "A Racial Classification by a State Is Invalid Under
the Equal Protection Clause Except as a Specific Remedy for Specific
' 49 A finding that
Unconstitutional or Illegal Racial Discrimination."
an important element of the admissions criteria, such as the LSAT,
was racially biased would surely bring a classification which purports
to remedy this illegality within this exception. The question which
would then have to be answered would be whether the specific classification utilized to determine preference actually remedied the discrimination created by the use of the LSAT.
A focus on racial discrimination may be useful even though it
might* be more accurate to speak in terms of discrimination against
those who have not been exposed to "mainstream" culture. The fact
that minority group members have suffered a long history of oppression and racial discrimination lends support to the' assertion that
merely "neutral institutional responses to situations in which prior
discrimination has produced minority inequality do not produce
equality of result, but crystallize the effect of past inequalities." 50
Further, the structure of our legislation and case law development is
such that it is easier to obtain a remedy on grounds of racial discrimination than for bias against a class, such as the "underprivileged,"
which is even more difficult to define than "race." Race has long been
a suspect classification which can be used as a constitutionally valid
category by a state only after the strictest of scrutiny.51

II.

CURRENT

LEGAL STATUS OF PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS:

DEFUNIS--RESOLUTION

A. Majority View
The majority of the Court took notice of the fact that DeFunis
had registered for his final term and would "complete his law school
studies at the end of the term for which he [was] registered regardless
of any decision this Court might reach on the merits of this litiga49. Brief for ADL at 21 (emphasis added).

50. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 281. See also Bell,
In Defense of Minority Admissions Programs, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 364 (1970); Comment, supra note 21.
51. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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tion .... ," For this reason, the majority concluded that no valid
"case or controversy" was presented to the Court as required under
article III of the Constitution for the Court to obtain jurisdiction
over the matter, and the case was dismissed as moot. 3 Thus, the
Supreme Court did not deal with the controversial and important
issue of preferential admissions.
B. Douglas" Dissent
Agreeing with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, 54 Justice
Douglas believed that the issue presented was not moot because there
was no assurance that DeFunis would in fact receive his degree. 0
"[B]ecause of the significance of the issues raised,"0 5 Douglas wrote a
lengthy dissenting opinion touching on the merits of the case. Applying the strict scrutiny standard of proof justified by the state law
school's use of a preferential admissions policy only for members of
certain racial groups, Douglas concluded that the constitutionality of
this policy could not be resolved on the record presented to the
Court.57 Presumably, such a conclusion would have supported the
plaintiff's claim of unconstitutionality since it concedes that the defendants have not sustained their burden of rebutting the presumption of unconstitutionality created under a strict scrutiny standard of
review.58 However, Justice Douglas did not go this far. While conceding that the defendants did not sustain their burden of proving the
constitutional validity of the preferential policy, he did not take the
logical step to the conclusion that this policy was invidiously discriminatory against DeFunis.
52. 94 S. Ct. at 1707.
53. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in law and Equity, arising

under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-

dors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies which the United States shall be a Party;
-to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens
of another State;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of

the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.
U.S.

CONST.

art. III, § 2 (emphasis added); see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. at

1705-06, citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
54. See 94 S. Ct. at 1721-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

55. See id. at 1708 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1715.
58. See notes 22-51 supra & accompanying text.
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This apparent contradiction can be resolved by Douglas' belief
that the objective criteria normally used for admissions decisions are
inherently racially biased. 59 Although not alleged or proved by the
defendant law school, Douglas' belief that the objective criteria used
in admissions decisions do not accurately reflect the potential capacities of minority students enabled him to justify the setting apart of
minority applications for separate, less demanding evaluation. While
conceding that a purely racial preference would indeed be invidiously
discriminatory, he seemed to argue that Washington's policy is not in
fact preferential but remedial in that it compensates for admissions
criteria which are inherently racially biased. Without an actively corrective admissions policy in which minority student qualifications are
considered separately and less stringently than those of majority applicants, race could be a "subtle force in eliminating minority members
because of cultural differences." 60 Although not attempting to elaborate on or conclusively resolve his allegations, Douglas recommended
that the case be "remanded for a' new trial to consider, inter alia,
whether the established LSAT tests [an important admissions criterion] should be eliminated so far as racial minorities are concerned." 61 The assertion that the LSAT is a racially biased criterion
needs support if it is to be the premise on which to base the alternative approach to the defense of preferential admissions policies.

III.

EQUAL PROTCTION AND THE

LSAT

A. The LSAT as a Valid Predictor-Clarificationof Terms
Although the LSAT was allegedly intended to serve egalitarian
and democratic ideals, 62 it may actually have a discriminatory effect. 63
59. See 94 S. Ct. at 1708-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

60. Id. at 1715.
61. Id.
62. The use of the LSAT involves a conflict between "aristocratic" and "equalitarian" ideals which dates back to 19th century England. The issue then was whether
to adopt the English (Inns of Court) method of education emphasizing a traditionally
scholarly curriculum or the more practically oriented continental (liberal university)
method. However, resolution of this issue in favor of the more practical method of

education did not end the underlying conflict.
In early Colonial America, the lack of formal training and discernible ethical

standards caused the legal profession to be viewed with suspicion. However, as commerce and industry grew, standards of competence and ethical conduct began to be
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The LSAT was designed and is utilized as a predictor of first year
g rades in law school.6 Typically, admissions decisions for law school
applicants are primarily based on a formula composed of LSAT scores
and college grades. By means of correlations between the scores resulting from such a formula and the actual performance of students possessing these scores, an index called the Predicted First Year Average
(hereinafter referred to as PFYA) of a particular student can be calculated.65 Thus, the future first year performance of applicants can be
developed. These developing standards were almost completely abolished in post-Revolutionary America where the emergence of the laissez-faire philosophy of the 19th century
represented a triumph for equalitarian ideals. While professional standards were set back
during this period, the public character of the legal profession was firmly established
as the right to practice law became to be regarded as a general privilege available to
the "average man."
The incompetence and corruption resulting from the lack of professional standards
led to the formation of state and local bar associations and the American Bar Association in the late 19th century. The ensuing struggle over the adoption of the first
standards for admission to the bar represented a revitalization of the battle between the
aristocrats and egalitarians. As the number of law schools and students increased
rapidly, the relatively open admissions policies developed in the 19th century lead to a
glut of lawyers by the 1920's. This enabled proponents of aristocratic ideals to continue
to raise legal and pre-legal educational standards. By 1921, a prerequisite of two years
of college was adopted as a standard for admission to law school by the American Bar
Association. In the late 1940's, factors including increased numbers of students from
diverse backgrounds and large numbers of returning veterans who had records containing interruptions, transfers, and military courses, greatly complicated the admissions
process. In 1947, several law schools banded together with the Educational Testing
Service to create the Law School Admission Test which was intended to act as a
common denominator in the admissions process between students with diverse back.
grounds. Thus, by intent, the LSAT was designed to be a "truly democratic device and
a major force in implementing the concept that law is a public profession which should
be open to all who can benefit and contribute in return." Consalus, The Law School
Admission Test and the Minority Student, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 501, 508. Contra,
Brill, supra note 2, at 70-71 (suggesting the possibility of a well-concealed racist intent
on the part of the E.T.S.). See generally J. HURST, THE GROWTH op AMiERICAN LAW
(1950).
63. See generally M. HOLMEN & R. DOcTER, EDUCATIONAL AND PSYoHOLOOIoAL
TESTING (1972); Bell, supra note 50; Brill, supra note 2; Consalus, supra note 62;
Linn, Fair Test Use in Selection, 43 Rnv. oF EDUC. REsEARCH-r 139 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Linn-Fair Test Use]; R. Linn, Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law
School, Sept. 27, 1974 (unpublished paper prepared for the Conference of the Future
of Law School Admission Council Research) [hereinafter cited as Linn-Test Bias];
Q'Neil, supra note 4; Ruch & Ash, Psychological Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 608
(1969); Thorndike, Concepts of Culture-Fairness, 8 J. OF EDUC. MEASUREMENT 63
(1971); Comment,supra note 21; 68 COLUbt. L. REv. 691 (1968).
64. See Consalus, supra note 62.
65. While the exact PFYA formula may vary from school to school, the formula
used by the University of Washington is representative. The formula utilizes grades
calculated on a 4.0 scale, LSAT scores ranging from 200 to 800, and a Writing Test
(administered on the same day as the LSAT), which is scored on a 20 to 80 scale. At
the University of Washington, "[r[he Admissions Committee combines these scores into
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Figure One
predicted from formulas based on actual past performances of students
achieving certain PFYA scores. Clarification of some terms is necessary
in order to understand the predictive capacities of the LSAT, which
is an important element of the PFYA formula.
In Figure One, the horizontal axis represents predicted performthe Predicted First Year Average [PFYA] by calculating the sum of": 51.3; 3.4751 X
the undergraduate grade point average; .0159 x LSAT score; and .0456 x the Writing Test score. The importance of the LSAT score in this formula can be seen in the
following hypothetical situation. According to this formula, an applicant with an undergraduate grade point average (GPA) of 3.5, a Writing Test score of 60, and an LSAT
score of 550 would have a PFYA of about 74.7. At the University of Washington, an
applicant with such a PFYA score would have been put on a hold status to be evaluted
further at a later time after all the applications had been received. An applicant with
identical GPA and writing test scores but with an LSAT score of 520 (instead of 550)
would have a PFYA score of about 74.3. By virtue of a 30 point difference in his LSAT
score which results in a difference of .4 in his total PFYA average, this applicant would
have been summarily rejected by the admissions committee since those with PFYA
scores below 74.5 were automatically culled out (except for a small number of applicants whose files indicated extraordinary promise). DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. at
1708 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The use of such a formula seems even more questionable when one considers that
"[t]he standard error of measurement for the LSAT is 30 points either way from the
'true' score. For example, an earned score of 500 (on a 200 to 800 scale), indicates
that there are two chances out of three that the 'true' score lies somewhere between
470 and 530." Consalus, supra note 62, at 513.
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ance (PFYA) of students based on a particular combination of such
variables as LSAT scores and college grades.60 The vertical axis represents the variables indicating the actual performance of a student
whose predicted performance has been calculated by the PFYA formula. In this situation, the vertical axis represents the actual first year
grade averages of law students. Each point shown on the diagram
represents historical data for a student for whom both the predicted
performance (PFYA) and actual performance are known. The diagonal line drawn through the points is called a regression line. This
line joins the average performance scores (average first year grade
point average in law school) with all possible Predicted First Year
Average scores. At each PFYA level on the horizontal axis, this line
corresponds with the average performance score and hence the predicted performance level for that particular PFYA.67 Thus, the points
on the regression line representing predicted levels of future performance are calculated on the basis of the averages of actual past performance of those with a particular PFYA.
The degree to which the predicted future performance accurately
corresponds with the actual performance achieved is expressed in
terms of a value called a correlation coefficient."" In the example presented, a positive correlation means that as the PFYA increases, the
actual performance variable will also increase. A correlation of +1.00
represents a perfect positive correlation. This is actually a theoretical
value which means that a given PFYA would correspond perfectly
with the actual performance of the individual receiving this score.
The coefficient of correlation between LSAT scores and first year
grades in law school usually ranges from 0.30 to 0.50.61 While it has
been argued that these levels of correlation make the test inaccurate
and useless as a predictive tool, it is generally conceded that the test
is a useful predictive device. 0 However, this does not resolve the
questions regarding the racial bias of the test because the equal protection clause is not satisfied by mere proof of valid prediction. 71 Even
66. See H. Breland & N. Breland, De Funis and the LSAT 4, Sept. 15, 1974 (unpublished paper on file in the Buffalo Law Review office).
67. See, e.g., D. HUNTSBERGER, ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL INFBR.ENcE 255-59
(2d ed. 1967); Thorndike, supra note 63.
68. See HUNTSBERGER, supra note 67, at 270-74.
69. See Bril, supra note 2; Consalus, supra note 62.
70. See Linn-Test Bias; Consalus, supra note 62.
71. See notes 14-21 supra & accompanying text.
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if not racially biased in its predictive function, it is arguable that the
concept of "equal protection under the law" afforded by the equal
protection clause would be violated if the use of this test denied qualified minority students an equal opportunity for access to law school 2
B. Defining Fairness

The most widely accepted standard for fairness in predictive tests
by psychometricians is equivalent predictive validity for two groups 73
According to this definition, "[i]f a test consistently underpredicts the
criterion performance for a given group it shows unfair discrimination or 'bias' against that group." 74 Thus, the LSAT would be racially
biased against members of certain racial groups if it consistently underpredicted the actual performance achievable for members of particular groups.75 It is important to emphasize at this point that for a
test to be racially biased, the underprediction must be confined to
particular racial groups. If the test uniformly underpredicted the future performance of all racial groups, it would have less validity as a
predictive tool; but it would have uniform, and hence not racially
biased, defectiveness.
While the evidence on the issue of the racial bias of the LSAT's
predictive capacities has been conflicting, it now appears settled that
the LSAT does not underpredict the future performance of minority
racial groups. On the contrary, there is a significant amount of evidence to support the contention that the LSAT may actually overpredict first year grades of minority students. 76 According to this evidence and under the prevailing view of bias in testing, it seems that
Justice Douglas' suggestions as to the possible racial bias of the test
72. Id.
73. Technically, "[a] test is biased for members of a subgroup of the population if,
in the prediction of a criterion for which the test was designed, consistent nonzero errors
of prediction are made for members of the subgroup. In other words, the test is biased

if the criterion score predicted from the common regression line is consistently too high
or low for members of the subgroup. With this definition of bias, there may be a connotation of 'unfair,' particularly if the use of the test produces a prediction that is too
low." Cleary, Test Bias, 5 J. o1 EDUC. MEASUREMENT 115 (1968).
74. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 559 (3d ed. 1968).
75. See generally id.; Linn-FairTest Use; Thorndike, supra note 63.
76. See note 70 supra. Linn asserts however, that while it seems generally true
that minority grades may be overpredicted, this generalization "is not intended to suggest that further investigations are unnecessary. There seems to be enough variation
from one situation to another to require that differential validity studies should be
conducted when technically possible." Lin-Test Bias at 43.
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Were unfounded. However, the issue can not be resolved under these
facts alone. Several additional factors support a conclusion that the
test may be racially biased even though it does seem to have equivalent predictive validity for all groups.
The use of a device which predicts future academic performance
as an important admissions criterion necessarily places great emphasis
on the importance of grades in admissions decisions. The admissions
process, and many hiring policies, appear to be based on a premise
which equates academic success in law school with corresponding success as a practising attorney. This may be a convenient oversimplification. The analytical skills acquired in law school comprise only one
aspect of a successful lawyer's practice. 77 While predicted grades are
certainly one criterion to consider, they should be used in conjunction
with other sources of information.7 8 Although such a procedure would
be costlier and more difficult to administer, the future direction of
the legal profession should not bow to arguments of administrative
convenience. Moreover, the great emphasis on grades in the admissions process may unfairly exclude minority students, as well as some
majority students, from law school who could have contributed to the
legal profession. The reportedly inferior performance by minority
students on the LSAT tests and subsequently in law school may not
be a reflection of inferior ability but merely a function of the fact that
the minority students have not been constantly exposed to the "mainstream" culture upon which law schools have been traditionally based
and upon which the LSAT's have been principally validated.70 While
this fact would not in itself be enough to sustain a charge of racial
discrimination, it emphasizes the limited value of the LSAT test. The
test only predicts future performance within a certain cultural con77. See Comment, supra note 21, at 477-78, 482.
78. For authority suggesting that the criterion of grades which is measured by
the LSAT may not be the only criterion which should be considered, see DeFunis V.
Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. at 1711-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 41-42, 507 P.2d 1169, 1187; Anderson, The Admissions Process in
Litigation, 15 Aiuz. L. REv. 81, 93, 96-100 (1973); Linn-Test Bias.
79. See Linn-Test Bias; Comment, supra note 21, at 482. Note that it could
be argued that the cultural traits for which the LSAT selects are necessary for the
successful practice of law and therefore if a bias exists in the test it is a reasonable
one. However, this argument is severely weakened if there is no concrete proof that
the traits selected by the test are the most relevant to the practice of law.
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text and does not measure intrinsic ability to perform well as a practicing attorney.8 0
Furthermore, even if grades were the most relevant category to
evaluate, LSAT scores are designed to predict success in the first year
of law school alone. While this has been defended by arguing that
success in the first year is necessary for ultimate survival, the adjust-'
ment to the
new and often seemingly hostile environment of a mostly white campus obviously takes more time for the minority than for the majority
student .... Like many other "slow starters" (most of whom have
less valid reasons for late blooming), minority students cannot be
fairly judged on the basis of first-year grades alone. Correlation
studies which stop at the end of freshman year are thus biased in a
subtle but most pernicious way.81
Additionally, it is not accurate to compare the scores of all minority students with those of all other students. A proper comparison
would "be between minority students and similarly disadvantaged
white students ... .,,82 The critical issue is whether poor blacks would
perform as well as poor whites. Even this comparison would not be
completely fair because the cultural barriers which minorities have to
cross are more difficult than those with which a "disadvantaged" majority student would have to deal. 3
Even considering the factors which point to the possible bias of
the LSAT, such factors would still not be sufficient to sustain a charge
of racial bias if the test is not biased in its basic predictive validity.
However, the conclusion that the LSAT is not a biased predictive tool
is based on a model of fairness which is no longer universally accepted by members of the testing profession.8 4 It has recently been
pointed out that when there are marked differences in the cultural
backgrounds of members of one group as compared to members of
80. See Anastasi, Psychological Tests, 62 TEAcHERS COLLEGE RECORD 389 (1961);
Linn-Fair Test Use.
81. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 735.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 735-6.
84. See Linn-Fair Test Use; Linn-Test Bias. Linn notes evidence of this development in the 1974 revision of the Standards for Educational and Psychological
Tests of the American Psychological Association, which states "there are different
definitions of fairness, and whether a given procedure is or is not fair may depend
on the definition accepted." Linn-Test Bias at 48 n.25.
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another group, there may be questions of the fairness of a predictive
test even where that test is found to have good predictive validity for
both groups. In 1971, Robert L. Thorndike, a Professor of Psychology,
noted that any meaningful definition of test fairness must ultimately
focus on the "fair use of the test scores, rather than on the scores
themselves." 8 5 He argued that even though a test is considered fair by
traditional standards, it may unfairly exclude a disproportionately
greater number of those who have a lower average score on the test.80
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Illustration of Thorndike's Alternate Definition
of Culture Fairness

Under Thorndike's model focusing on test use, the predictive function of the LSAT is not the only function to receive scrutiny because
85. Thorndike, supra note 63.
86. More specifically, Thorndike argued that when it is shown that:
two groups differ appreciably in mean test score... [a procedure based on the
traditional model of fairness] is "unfair" to the lower [scoring] group as a
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the test serves not only to predict future performance but also, and
more importantly, to exclude potential students. It is this function of
exclusion that Thorndike's definition takes into consideration and
which the traditional model of fairness ignores. Because of the great
significance of Thorndike's attack on the traditional model, it will
now be examined in detail.
Figure Two illustrates the problem revealed by Thorndike with
the traditional definition of fairness.87 In this figure, the solid horizontal axis (labeled "Test") represents LSAT scores and the solid
vertical axis (labeled "Criterion") depicts the first year grade point
averages in law school predicted from these test scores. In the situation presented, the regression line, which has been calculated by past
correlations between LSAT and performance scores as illustrated in
Figure One, is identical for two groups whose average criterion or
performance scores and average LSAT scores diverge. This means that
at every test score level on the regression line, the average, and hence
predicted, first year performance, calculated from actual past performances of individuals achieving a particular LSAT score, corresponds
for the members of both groups. Thus, even though the members of
group B have scored lower on the LSAT and have correspondingly
lower predicted performance scores, the test would be considered fair
under the traditional definition since future performance is predicted
with the same accuracy for both groups. Note, however, that when
the average LSAT scores for the two groups differs significantly and
the same regression line is used to predict future performance for
these divergent groups, the difference between average test scores is
substantially larger than the difference between performance predicted
from these scores. This relationship has significant consequences for
the members of group B.
Suppose that the average of group A on the criterion (predicted
future performance) axis represented the minimum acceptable performance in the first year of law school' That is to say, those who
perform at or above this level are considered successful and those
whole in the sense that the proportion qualified on the test will be smaller,
relative to the higher-scoring group, than the proportion that will reach any
specified level of criterion performance.
Id. at 63.
87. Figure Two and accompanying discussion are originally found in Linn-Fair
Test Use at 147-48.
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performing below it are considered failures. In Figure Two, about
50 percent of group A and about 20 percent of group B (represented by the shaded area) have criterion scores above this hypothetical cutting point. Since only the LSAT scores and not the criterion
scores of the applicants are known in advance, selection of applicants
must be determined on the basis of these test scores which are used to
predict their future performance (criterion scores). Since about 50
percent of group A achieved LSAT scores which correspond to predicted performance at or above the success-failure line, the proportion
of this group which would be ultimately selected for admissions is
equivalent to the proportion that has been predicted to be successful.
As can be seen from the diagram however, no members of group B
have achieved LSAT scores which would warrant selection even
though 20 percent of this group has been predicted to be able to perform at a satisfactory level. Thus, while the "relative proportions in
groups A and B qualified on the test are .50 and essentially zero
respectively . . . the [corresponding] proportions above the success-

failure point on the criterion variable are approximately .50 and
.20

....

-88 It is this phenomenon, identified by Thorndike, which the

traditional model of fairness disregards. The resulting inequality for
minority students is not that a smaller number of them will ultimately be selected under the LSAT criterion but a disproportionately
smaller number of potentially qualified students will be selected. In
order to create a fair selection process for minorities in which similar
proportions of potentially qualified students are selected from both
groups, it might be possible to utilize differential regression or selection lines. While various alternative models of fairness have been proposed which differ in their conceptions of fairness, there is a growing
consensus of opinion among psychometricians that the traditional
model of fairness is inadequate. 89
CONCLUSION
The implications of Thorndike's model of fairness are not conclusive. 90 However, they reveal a significant defect in the traditional
88.
89.
90.
reticians

Id. at 148.
See note 83 supra.
Criticism of Thorndike's model has come from various psychometric theoincluding N. S. Petersen and M. R. Novick. Alternative definitions of fairness
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definition upon which the assurances of the racial impartiality of the
LSAT have been based. At least some evidence is provided by Thorndike's model which shows that even though the LSAT may have
equivalent predictive validity for both minority and majority students
(and is therefore unbiased under the traditional definition of fairness), the test may, nevertheless, exclude a disproportionately greater
number of potentially qualified minority students than majority students from law school. If this contention is upheld, the concept of
equality inherent in the equal protection clause-that a state may not
deny all naturally equal persons an equal opportunity for access to a
state distributed benefit (or burden) -may be violated by the use of
the LSAT as an important admissions criterion.
The presumption of unconstitutionality created by such a finding could lead to at least two results if not successfully rebutted. First,
a court could prohibit the use of the LSAT as an admission criterion
without upholding the preferential admissions policy used to remedy
the defect in the test. This may, at the least, necessitate the development of admissions procedures which take into consideration a wider
range of criterion having greater relevance to the practice of law. Alternatively, such a finding could provide added support for the contention that a "carefully constructed" 91 preferential policy is permitted, and perhaps required, by the Constitution to compensate for
criteria which may illegally exclude a disproportionate number of potentially qualified students from law school because of their cultural
backgrounds.
Whether sufficient proof exists to sustain a prima facie case for
the racial bias of the LSAT creating a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality, is not clear. The determination of whether the test
is racially biased is severely complicated by the fact that there is virtually no agreement among testing professionals as to what actually
constitutes racial bias in standardized tests. This problem is compounded by the especially difficult question of how to accurately define the class of persons who should be afforded the benefits of a
preferential admissions policy.
Clearly, however, the uncertainties of the legal duties and standards in this area should not overshadow the necessity for a reexaminahave been formulated by N. S. Cole and R. D. Darlington. See Linn-Fair Test Use;
Linn-Test Bias.
91. See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
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tion of the criteria used in law school admissions decisions where there
is even some evidence that these indices are racially biased. The unresolved questions surrounding the use of the LSAT are too important
to be dismissed by arguments of administrative convenience or assertions of racial impartiality based on a psychometric model which is
no longer universally accepted. 2 Those in control of selecting the future professionals in this country should, at least, be compelled to reply to the real possibility of racial bias in the law school admissions
process.
DAvm A. WEBER
92. See note 84 supra.

